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PE'OPLE v. ALCALDE

[24 C.2d

Mr. Justice Cardozo, "Discrimination so subtle is a feat h~.
yond the compass of ordinary minds. The reverberating
clang of those accusatory words would drown all weaker
sounds. It is for ordinary minds, and not for psychoanalysts, that our rules of evidence are framed." (Shepard v.
United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 [54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196].)
Such a declaration could not be admitted without the risk
that the jury would conclude that it tended to prove the acts
of the defendant as well as of the declarant, and it is clear
that the prosecution used the declaration to that end. There
is no dispute as to the identity of the deceased or as to where
she was at the time of her death. Since the evidence is overwhelming as to who the deceased was and where she was
when she met her death, no legitimate purpose could be served
by admitting her declarations of what she intended to do on
the evpning of November 22d. The only purpose that could
be served by admitting such declarations would be to induce
the belief that the defendant went out with the deceased,
took her to the scene of the crime and there murdered her.
Rer declarations cannot be admitted for that purpose without setting aside the rule against hearsay.
The evidence in question was so damaging to the defendant
that it cannot reasonably be said that it probably had no
effect on the jury's verdict. (People v. Putnam, 20 CaI.2d
885, 892, 893 [129 P.2d 367].)
Edmonds, J., concurred
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[L. A. No. 18527. In Bank. May 1, 1944.]
Estate of ALFRED EASTER, Deceased. CALIFORNIA
TRUST COMPANY, as Administrator, etc., Appellant,
v. PAUL W. JONES, as Administrator, etc., et aI., Respondents.
PAUL W. JONES, as Administrator, etc., Appellant, v.
SECURITY-FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LOS ANGELES, as Trustee, et aI., Respondents.
[1] Decedents' Estates-Final Distribution-Effect of Decree-

Construction by Resort to Will.-The effect of a will is controlled by the decree of distribution when final.
[2] Id.-Final Distribution-Effect of Decree-Estates· Created.A decree of distribution providing that a trust shall terminate
on the widow's death and that the trust property "shall go to
and vest in" the testator's hbirs at law in accordance with the
1020 statute of succession, distributes a contingent interest only
to the heirs, the contingency being their survivorship of the
widow upon whose death the trust terminates.
[3] Wills - Construction - Future Tense: Decedents" ':EstatesFinal Distribution-Effect of Decree-Consti-uction.....:..lnas~'
much as wills are made to take effect at a future 'tinie;it, may
be proper to construe t.he future tense in a will as:applyinr.,
to the time of the testator's death, and not to astiU later time;:
A decree of distribution, on the other hand, normallYSPllaks<
as of its own date, for it is usually an order for, ,the present ,
delivery of property, and the use of the future te:nse must ordinarily connote future action.
APPEALS trom parts 'Of a judgment ottheSuperiol'
Court of Los Angeles County decreeing distribution 'of an)
estate. Charles C. Montgomery, Judge( pro tem: Affirmed.
, ,,';;.: 1;';''.1_

B. R. Ware, Raymond W.Stephcnsand 'Stephcns,Jon~a;;
Inch & La Fever for Appellants.
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Craig & Weller, Frank C. Weller and Thomas S. Tobin
for Respondents.
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[1] See lIB Cal.Jur. 803; 21 Am.Jur. 653.
[2] See lIB Cal.Jur. 823.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, § 1059; [2] .DCce~
delits' Estates, § 1052; [3 J Wills, § 289; Decedents' Estates, § 1048.
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GIBSON, C. J.-Pursuant to the will of Alfred Easter,
certain property was distributed by the probate court in
trust during the life of his wife. On the wife's death the
trustee filed a final account and petitioned for instructions
and for distribution. From portions of the resulting decree
these appeals were taken, which are presented on a joint bill
of exceptions.
The will, executed March 30, 1920, provided that the
trustee should pay to the testator's wife, Catherine, $300 a
month during the term of her natural life, and the balance
of the net income was to be divided among his children by
a former marriage as follows: one-third to his son, Ephraim,
and two~thirds in equal shares to his three daughters, Kate
B. Gherky, Elizabeth R. Marriott, and Martha B. Todd. The
share of any child who might die was to be paid to his or her
issue per stirpes, and if the son left a wife, but no issue, she
was to be paid one-half of his share and the remainder was
to be divided among the daughters. There was a spendthrift
provision as to such income, and a provision that the trustee
should allow the wife Catherine to live on certain property,
or should provide another home for her rent-free. The trust
was originally to terminate upon the death of the survivor
of his wife and four children, and it was provided that "Upon
the termination of this trust my said Trustee shall convey,
deliver and pay over all the corpus of said trust fund then
in its possession or under its control unto my heirs at law in
accordance with the present statute of succession of the State
of California." The will recited that the estate consisted
largely of community property, but that the wife had agreed
that the provisions of the will were for her best interests.
The will provided that if she should elect to take a share of
the community property all provisions for her benefit should
lapse and the net income from the trust should go to the
children. Endorsed on the will was an agreement by the
wife to take under its terms and not to claim any part of
the estate as her share of the community property.
By a codicil dated May 2, 1921, the testator provided that
the trust should terminate upon the death of his wife Catherine and that on the death of his son Ephraim, leaving a
widow but no issue, the whole of the net income from the
trust, after payment of the $300 to the testator's wife, should
be paid in equal shares to his three daughters and the son's
widow. In a second codicil dated January 13, 1922, the testa
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directed that certain other real property should not be sold
tor devised certain real property to his wife and son, and
by the trustee during the lifetime of his wife.
When the testator died on February 2, 1923, his only heirs
were his wife, Catherine, and his four children. The wife
filed in the probate proceeding an election to take under the
will and to waive "any claim which she might make or aSsert
in or to any of the property of said estate by reason of any
community interest or share that she may have or be entitled·
to therein." The decree of distribution, dated October 3, 1923,
set forth directions for administering the trust and provided
that" Upon the death of the said Catherine Easter, the trust
hereinbefore referred to shall terminate and all of the property then in the hands of the trustee or in its possession or
control, shall go to and vest in the heirs at law of the said Alfred Easter, deceased, in accordance with the statute of succession of the State of California in force in the month of MarCh.,
1920, and the trustee is directed to convey, deliver and pay over
all the corpus of said trust funds then in its possession or
under its control unto such heirs in accordance with the
statute of succession of the State of California in force in the
month of March, 1920." (Italics added.)
Prior to the death of the wife Catherine, on January 8,
1942, but after the testator's death, the daughter Kate B.
Gherky died, leaving two daughters, Grace Winkler and
Kathleen Broadridge. During the same period the son Ephraim died without issue, but left a widow who also died before
the death of Catherine. When the trust terminated upon
Catherine's death, the trustee instituted the present proceeding and the lower court ordered the corpus to be distributed
one-third to each of the surviving daughters of the testator,
Martha B. Todd and Elizabeth R. Marriott, and the one-third
share of the deceased daughter to the two granddaughters,
Grace Winkler and Kathleen Broadridge. Appeals from this
portion of the decree were taken by the administrator with
the will annexed of the estate of the son Ephraim, and by
the administrator with the will annexed of the estate of the
testator's wife Catherine.
The question for decision is whether the identity of the
"heirs at law" (who were to take on termination of the trust)
is to be determined as of the time of death of the testator or
the time of termination of the trust. If the interests of the
'" 0.24-7
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heirs vested at the time of termination of the trust rather
than at the time of the testator's death, then the estates of
the testator's wife and son would take nothing because of
their prior deaths, and the decree must be affirmed.
' The appeUants contend that the devise of a remainder to
"heirs" or to others determinable at the time of the testator's
death passes a vested remainder as of that time in the absence
of a contrary intention clearly expressed, and that there is
no evidence in the record, either in the stipulated facts, the
testamentary 'documents or the 1923 decree of distribution
to sustain a finding that the testator intended to postpone the
vesting and thus limit participation in the remainder interest
to his blood relatives living at the termination of the trust.
On the other hand, the respondents point to a number of
provisions in the will and the 1923 decree as indicating an
intention that the corpus of the trust should vest in the testator's children, or the lawful issue of any deceased child per
stirpes, upon the termination of the trust.
[1] It is settled, however, as conceded by the appellants,
that the effect of a will is controUed by the decree of distribu_
tion when final. The decree is said to be "conclusive as an
ascertainment and adjudication of the terms of the trust, and
of the rights of all parties claiming any legal or equitable
interest under the will. (Goad v. Montgomery, 119 Cal. 552
[51 P. 681, 63 Am.St.Rep. 145J ; Williams v. Marx, 124 Cal.
22 [56 P. 603J; More v. More, 133 Cal. 489 [65 P. 1044,].)
The decree supersedes the will and prevails 'over any pro-,
vision therein which may be thought' inconsistent with the
decree.' (Goad v. Montgomery, 119 Cal. 552 [51 P. 681,
63 Am.St.Rep. 145J.)" (Keating v. Smith, 154 Cal. 186, 191
[97 P. 300J.) In Luscomb v. Fintzelberg, 162 Cal. 433, 438
[123 P. 247], the court stated, "It was equally within the
jurisdiction of the court, and its duty, to determine . . .
what other persons had legal or equitable rights to the distributable property of the estate, and the extent and nature
of their interests. Having jurisdiction to determine these'
matters on distribution, when the decree does so determine
them, although the determination may be incorrect, it is conclu~ive as to the rights of heirs; legatees; and devisees unless
corrected on appeal. It is not subject to collateral attack or
to be impeached by resort to the terms of the Will., 'The rights
of the parties must thereafter be determined by resort to the,
decree of distribution alolle as a final and conclusive ,adjudi-
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cation of the testamentary disposition which the deceased
made of his property." (See, also, Estate of Wallace, 11
Cal.2d 338 [79 P.2d 1094]; Estate of Goldberg, 10 Cal.2d
709 [76 P.2d 508].) This being so, the determination of this
cause turns upon the proper construction of the decree of
distribution.
[2] We find no uncertainty or ambiguity in the decree of
distribution. It expressly provides that "Upon the death of
the said Catherine Easter the trust . . . shall terminate and
all of the property then in the hands of the trustee or in' its
possession or control, shall go to and vest in the heirs at law
of the said Alfred Easter, deceased," in accordance with the
1920 statute of succession. (Italics added.) This portion of
the decree was properly construed by, the trial court herein
to distribute a contingent interest only to the heirs, the contingEmcy being their survivorship of the testator',s wife, upon
whose death the trust terminated. In other words, the interest of the heirs was to vest only upon their surviving such
'termination of the trust~ The decree of distribution, by providing that two things should occur "Upon the death of the
,said Catherine Easter, " namely, 1. "the trust . , . shall
, terminate," and 2. "all the property then in the hands of
the trustee . . . shall go to and vest in the heirs at law of
said Alfred Easter, deceased," clearly indicates an intention
that the interests of the heirs should vest at the time of the
termination of the trust. Any other construction woUld ignore
the normal and usual meaning of the words "shall go to and
vest in the heirs at law."
'
[3] Appellants urge, however, that use of the future tense
of verbs 'in devising or distributing a remainder biterest' do~
not militate against it vesting on the death 'of the testator,
citing Esta'te of Wallace, 11 Ca1.2d 338 [79 P.2d 19941 ;
Estate otDunphy, 147 Cal. 95 [81 P. 315] ; 'and Estale of
Newman, 68 Cal.App. 420 [229 P. 898]. 'These decisions 'are
not controlling here. The Wallace case involved the meaning
of "shall distribute" and the other cases dealt with the construction of wills. From their nature, 'wills' 'are made to' take
effect at a future time, i.e., at the death of the testator, 'and
hence it may be proper to construe the future tense when
used in a will as applying to the time of the testator's deilth,
and not to a still later time. A decree of distribution, on the
other hand, normally speaks as of' its own date, for :i't' ~
"JJ
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usually an order for the present delivery of property, and
the use of the future tense must ordinarily connote future
action. In our opinion, such was the intention here.
The testator's widow claimed no rights in hostility to the
will, but the administrator of her estate claimed that the remainder estate should be distributed as community and not
as separate property_ However, he concedes that the community question "may be ignored if this Court should sustain that part of the decree below holding that the widow
and son took no part of the remainder interest as devisees
under Mr. Easter's will or as distributees under the 1923
decree" of distribution. We therefore find it unnecessary to
discuss the problems and contentions relating to the character of the property and the effect of the widow's election
or waiver, if any, of her claims to such remainder interest.
Those portions of the decree appealed from directing distribution of the corpus of the trust property are affirmed.

!

, "!

Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Schauer,
J., concurred.
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TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-The majority OpInIOn rests
entirely on the decree of distribution. It holds that the decree
is neither uncertain nor ambiguous and that its provision
that the property, upon the termination of the trust, "shall
go to and vest in the heirs at law" clearly indicates that the
interests of the heirs were to vest at the time of the termination of the trust. The word "vest," however, has more than
one meaning (see 44 Words & Phrases (perm. ed. 1940) 191.
194; 2 Simes, Law of Future Interests, § 347, p. 82; Leach,
Cases on Future Interests, (2d ed.) 255), and it is not clear
that the probate court used the word to mean vest in right
rather than vest in possession. It is hardly conceivable that
the court would have used such general language had it intended to pass on the question whether the gifts to the heirs
vested in right upon the death of the testator or upon the
termination of the trust.
There is a presumption in favor of the vesting of testamentary dispositions at death. (Prob. Code, § 28, formerly
Civ. Code, § 1341; Estate of Newman, 68 Cal.App. 420, 424
[229 P. 898] ; In re De Vries, 17 Cal.App. 184, 190 [119 P.
109] ), and "words expressive of future time are to be referred to the vesting in possession if they reasonably can be,
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rather than to the vesting in right." (Estate of Newman,
supra, at p. 429; see 49 A.L.R. 186, 187; 127 A.L.R. 609, 610.).
The decree provides that the property "shall go to" the heirs.
These are "clear words of direct devise" at the time of death
(Estate of Wallace, 11 Cal.2d 338, 341 [79 P.2d 1094] ; Keating v. Smith, 154 Cal. 186 [97 P. 300], and their import is
not altered by the accompanying word "vest" (In re De
Vries, supra, at 191-192; Randall v. BlSnk 0/ America, 48
Cal.App.2d 249 [119 P.2d 754]) or by the provision that the
trustees shall "convey, deliver and pay.over" the trust fund ..
(Estate of Wallace, supra; Estate 0/ Newman, supra; see Restatement, Property, Future Interests, Parts 3 and 4; § 260.)
In the light of the foregoing authorities it is clear that the
decree is open to the construction that the court was referring
to the vesting in possession of the interests of the heirs. Since
it cannot be determined from the decree whether the interests
of the heirs vested in right at the death of the testator or
upon the termination of the trust; reference must be made
to the will to ascertain the meaning of the decree. (Estate 0/
Goldberg, 10 Cal.2d 709 [76 P.2d 508].)
The will provides: "This trust shall terminate upon· the
death of my said Wife Catherine," and "Upon the termina·
tion of this trust my said Trustee shall convey, deliver and
pay over all the corpus of said trust fund then in its possession or under its control unto my heirs at law in accordance
with the present statute of succession of the State of California. " Under these provisions the heirs must be determined
as of the death of the testator. "It is a general rule of
testamentary construction, so universally recognized as to render unnecessary a full citation of the cases which support it,
that in the absence of clear and unambiguous indications of
a different intention to be derived from the context of the
will, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances, the
class described as testator's heirs, or such persons as would
take his estate by the rules of law if he had died intestate,
to whom a remainder is given by will, is to be ascertained at
the death of the testator." (Estate 0/ Newman, 68 Cal.App.
420,424 [229 P. 898] ; Estate 0/ Wallace, 11 Cal.2d 338 [79
P.2d 1094]; Keating v. Smith, 154 Cal. 186 [97 P. 300];
Estate 0/ Ritzman, 186 Cal. 567 [199 P. 783]; Estate of
1)e Vries, 17 Cal.App. 184 [119 P. 109] ; Randall v. Bank of
America, 48 Cal.App.2d 249 [119 P.2d 754] ; Estate of alann,
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177 Cal. 347 [170 P. 833]; In re Rider's Estate, 199 Cal.
724 [251 P.' 799]; Rest., Property, Future Interests, Parts
3' and 4, §§ 260, 308 ;33 L.R..A..N.S. 2; 13 .A..L.R. 615; 49
.A..L.R. 178; 127 .A..L.R. 604.) Such rules of construction are
as essential as rules of construction for deeds or negotiable
instruments. Without them counsel could not advise their,
clients with any reasonable certainty, for the meaning of a'
will could not be ascertained until it had been passed upon
by a court of last resort. (See Brown, Problems of Construction Arising In The Law of Property-Particularly In The
Law of Future Interests, 79 Pa.L.Rev. 385, 389.) When a
testator resorts to the word "heirs" after having exhausted
his specific wishes by the previous limitations, he' states in
effect that he is content thereafter to let the law take its
course. (Whall v. Converse, 146 Mass. 345, 348 [15 N.E.
660); Gilman v. Congregational Home Missionary Society,
276 Mass. 580 [177 N.E. 621] ; Matter of Bump, 234 N.Y. 60
[136 N.E.295].) Under the law, which favors the creation
of vested rather than contingent remainders, the testator's
"heirs at law" are the persons who answer that description
at t,he time of the testator's death. (Ibid.)
'Respondents contend that a different intention can be derived from the context of the will, read in the light of the
surrounding circumstances. Particular reliance is placed on
the fact that one of the testator's heirs was his wife, who was
given a life interest in the same property. If the person to
whom a life interest in the property has been given is the sole
heir of the testator, there is some incongruity in also giving
such a person all the interest under the limitation to "heirs."
The circumstance of his being the sole heir tends to establish
that the testator intended the heirs to be ascertained as of the
death of the sole heir. (Rest., Property, Future Interests,
Parts 3 and 4, § 308, Comment k, p. 1715; Estate 0/ Wilson,
184 Cal. 63, 64 [193 P. 581].) When, however, the taker of
a prior interest is one of several heirs at the testator's death
"no constructional tendency is sufficiently definite to be capable of statement" (Rest., Property, Future Interests, Parts
3 and 4, Comment k, p. 1717), and there is nothing to warrant the court's departing from the usual meaning of the
word "heirs." (Estate of Newman, 68 Cal..A.pp. 420 [229.
P. 898J.) Such a departure would exclude. not simply a
particular heir, but all the heirs of a testator who die before
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the particular heir, and would substitute others in their
place. (See Ferrier, Gifts to Heirs in Oalifornia, 26 Cal.L.
Rev. 413, 423.)
, Respondents invoke the rule set forth in Estate 01 Hdrtsd'n,
218 Cal. 536, 540 [24 P.2d 171], that "where the provisions
of a will are capable of two interpretations, under one of
which tho'se of the blood of the testator will take, while under
the other the property will go to strangers, the interpretation
by which the property goes to those of the blood of the testator is preferred." A gift to heirs, however, vests the property in those entitled to take under the statute of succession
(Prob. Code, § 108, formerly Civ. Code, § 1334), and the provision in the will for the gift of the corpus to the testator's
heirs "in accordance with the present statute of succession"
contains no suggestion that the disposition of that corpus is
limited to heirs who are" of the blood" of the testator. (See
Estate of Watts, 179 Cal. 20, 23 [175 P.415].) Othel" provisions of the will invoked by respondents are insufficient in
my opinion to warrant a construction different from the usual
meaning of the word "heirs." The provisions that the title
to the home for Mrs. Easter should be vested in the trustee,
and that the Catalina Court and Sixth Grammercy properties
should not be sold during the life of Mrs. Easter, do not pur·
port to qualify the gift over of the remainder interest. Neither
do the provisions for the payment of income to Ephraim's
widow during Mrs. Easter's lifetime, nor the references to the
issue of deceased children, nor the references in the spendthrift provisions to income only.
'
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied May 29,
1944. Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing.

